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Background: The revised World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations (2005) request a timely and
all-hazard approach towards surveillance, especially at the subnational level. We discuss three questions of syndromic
surveillance application in the European context for assessing public health emergencies of international concern:
(i) can syndromic surveillance support countries, especially the subnational level, to meet the International Health
Regulations (2005) core surveillance capacity requirements, (ii) are European syndromic surveillance systems
comparable to enable cross-border surveillance, and (iii) at which administrative level should syndromic surveillance
best be applied?
Discussion: Despite the ongoing criticism on the usefulness of syndromic surveillance which is related to its clinically
nonspecific output, we demonstrate that it was a suitable supplement for timely assessment of the impact of three
different public health emergencies affecting Europe. Subnational syndromic surveillance analysis in some cases proved
to be of advantage for detecting an event earlier compared to national level analysis. However, in many cases,
syndromic surveillance did not detect local events with only a small number of cases.
The European Commission envisions comparability of surveillance output to enable cross-border surveillance. Evaluated
against European infectious disease case definitions, syndromic surveillance can contribute to identify cases that might
fulfil the clinical case definition but the approach is too unspecific to comply to complete clinical definitions. Syndromic
surveillance results still seem feasible for comparable cross-border surveillance as similarly defined syndromes are
analysed.
We suggest a new model of implementing syndromic surveillance at the subnational level. In this model, syndromic
surveillance systems are fine-tuned to their local context and integrated into the existing subnational surveillance and
reporting structure. By enhancing population coverage, events covering several jurisdictions can be identified at higher
levels. However, the setup of decentralised and locally adjusted syndromic surveillance systems is more complex
compared to the setup of one national or local system.
Summary: We conclude that syndromic surveillance if implemented with large population coverage at the subnational
level can help detect and assess the local and regional effect of different types of public health emergencies in a timely
manner as required by the International Health Regulations (2005).
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Diverse health threats and implementation of the
International Health Regulations (2005) in Europe
Europe faces different health threats which are arising
from infectious disease outbreaks, natural disasters or
man-made events. The variety of potential health threats
led the World Health Organization (WHO) to adjust
their International Health Regulations (IHR (2005)). The
IHR (2005) now follow an all-hazard approach, focusing
on an “illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin
or source, that presents or could present significant
harm to humans” [1]. Detection, assessment and imme-
diate reporting play an important role in the IHR (2005)
and Article 5 requests every member state, within five
years after the regulations came into force, to have
established appropriate surveillance and response cap-
acities [1]. Until now, surveillance in Europe primarily
follows the approach of specific notifiable communicable
disease reporting, which does not foresee detection or
assessment of other health threats which are not defined
as notifiable diseases [2]. Generally, notifiable commu-
nicable disease reporting provides data on a weekly
basis. Timelier information and information on different
kinds of health threats are difficult to retrieve because
separate public health surveillance systems cannot be
established for every kind of threat. As a result, about
one third of WHO Europe member states asked for an
extension of the compliance date for implementing the
core capacities for public health surveillance and re-
sponse with the new all-hazard requirement being seen
as an obstacle [3].
Public health surveillance in Europe – a matter of
comparability
For the European Union (EU), comparability of surveil-
lance results in the form of comparable case definitions,
data formats and diagnostic codes is of high value to en-
able cross-border monitoring of events. EU member states,
however, are very diverse and adopting comparative case
definitions based on similar data sources is difficult to
achieve [4]. The new directive on serious cross-border
health threats 1082/2013/EU acknowledges the IHR
(2005) requirements and strengthens the Union’s mandate
to coordinate in times of public health crises which are po-
tentially concerning more than one member state [5]. For
communicable disease surveillance, the directive requires
member states to provide information to the EU on the
progression of an outbreak and about any unusual phe-
nomena and outbreaks of unknown origin. The EU pro-
vides case definitions for comparable reporting of cases in
implementing decision 2012/506/EU which member states
have to use [6]. These are based on a classification of cases
based on clinical signs and symptoms, laboratory, and epi-
demiological characteristics enabling the identification ofpossible, probable and confirmed cases. For threats of bio-
logical origin consisting of bio toxins or other harmful bio-
logical agents not related to communicable diseases and
threats of chemical, environmental or unknown origin,
member states shall inform each other based on the infor-
mation from their own surveillance systems. However, the
EU may adopt case definitions to which member states
shall adhere [5]. The question is how member states’ sur-
veillance capacity in terms of the IHR (2005) can be
strengthened against the backdrop of both, European
comparability requirements and European diversity.
Role of the subnational level for surveillance in Europe
We understand the subnational level in this paper as pri-
mary level, e.g., county, and intermediate level, e.g.,
province, of the public health response in a country ac-
cording to the IHR (2005) [1]. The subnational level is
often the first to identify a health threat and has the re-
sponsibility to inform higher levels about an event. Also
the response to an event is starting at the subnational
level [7]. The IHR (2005) explicitly request the responsi-
bility of the primary and intermediate public health re-
sponse level to detect events in the whole state territory
and for immediately assessing and reporting information
on such events to higher levels [1].
But how can the subnational level be equipped with the
means to detect different types of events or related health
effects in a timely fashion? Local intelligence in the form
of professionals reporting on events, e.g., in schools, or
health care institutions, are the cornerstone of detecting
the onset of events at the local level, as shown for ex-
ample, during the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic [8,9]. Still,
there is a risk to overlook patterns that might be detected
only when taking a wider perspective beyond the patients
treated by one clinician or in one institution [10,11]. Sur-
veillance systems that pool information from multiple in-
stitutions or jurisdictions can potentially detect events
that are not represented in the data of any single region or
institution. Using routine data, for instance from health
care services, for timely detection and assessment of pub-
lic health threats is in principle the idea behind the ap-
proach of syndromic surveillance.
Syndromic surveillance – a means to meet the IHR (2005)
surveillance requirements?
According to a recent definition by the European project
Triple S-AGE, syndromic surveillance augments trad-
itional surveillance systems by providing clinically non-
specific but (near) real-time information on the public
health impact of events, gained from existing and if pos-
sible automatically generated data that were originally
not collected for surveillance purposes [12]. The Triple
S-AGE project inventoried syndromic surveillance sys-
tems in Europe and provided a detailed overview on
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dromic surveillance systems worldwide and 60 in Europe
[13,14]. Syndromic data sources are ranging from non-
clinical sources such as web search logs, medications
sales registries, and telephone helpline call logs to clin-
ical sources such as chief complaints from primary care
or emergency departments, and veterinary records [14].
Timeliness, flexibility and cost-effectiveness are con-
sidered to be the major strengths of syndromic surveil-
lance which could make it a suitable solution for gaining
timely information on different kinds of health threats
as required by the IHR (2005) [15]. Its major weakness
is the lack of specificity which can lead to false alerts
and undetected events [16]. Therefore, the usefulness of
syndromic surveillance is not undisputed, although the
approach has been applied for over a decade, using dif-
ferent kinds of data sources and targeting various health
threats [16-18]. The WHO evaluated syndromic surveil-
lance as not applicable to become part of a global regu-
lation to support countries to meet the IHR (2005)
requirements but it was rated as potentially useful to
support surveillance within countries [19]. This assess-
ment was done back in 2001. We think it is time for a
reassessment based on the evidence collated since then,
and to consider a reinforced endorsement of syndromic
surveillance for the support of countries’ surveillance
capacity as required by the IHR (2005).
Below, we discuss the following questions around the
usefulness of syndromic surveillance in the light of the
IHR (2005) implementation in Europe:
1. How can syndromic surveillance be used to support
European countries to meet the IHR (2005)
requirements for the core capacity of immediate
detection, assessment and reporting of different
kinds of (potential) Public Health Emergencies of
International Concern (PHEIC), especially at the
subnational level?
2. How comparable are syndromic surveillance systems
to enable cross-border surveillance in Europe
referring to case definitions, data formats and
diagnostic coding systems?
3. What are strengths and weaknesses of different
implementation models for subnational syndromic
surveillance in Europe?
Discussion
Contribution of syndromic surveillance to support
European countries to meet the IHR (2005) requirements
In the following, we explore three European public
health emergencies during which syndromic surveillance
was applied, the 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic, the
volcanic ash plume which covered Europe in 2010, and
the O104:H4 gastrointestinal outbreak in 2011. Thepandemic was declared a PHEIC in the framework of
the IHR (2005) while the other two events were reported
to WHO by member states as potential PHEIC. We ana-
lyse the contribution of syndromic surveillance in the
three cases in terms of timeliness, added value of subna-
tional level application and flexibility in terms of an all-
hazard approach.
Purpose of syndromic surveillance during three public
health emergencies
During the A/H1N1 pandemic, the purpose of the appli-
cation of syndromic surveillance was to detect the onset
of the pandemic in a country and to gain timely infor-
mation on the spatial and temporal development. Next
to the syndromic surveillance systems listed in Table 1
and Table 2a, we identified seven additional systemsb, for
which no details were retrievable and they were not in-
cluded in further analysis [13,20].
During the time in which the volcanic ash plume cov-
ered Europe in April 2010, syndromic surveillance was
used to timely assess if there was a public health impact of
the plume or rather to provide reassurance that the plume
had no health effect. Next to the syndromic surveillance
systems listed in Table 3, further syndromic surveillance
systems were reported in Iceland and France for which we
could not find any further details [39]. None of the sys-
tems produced a syndromic signal which could be con-
nected to the ash plume. This was in line with the
conclusions by WHO and the European Centre for Dis-
ease Prevention and Control (ECDC) [39,40]. During this
public health emergency, syndromic surveillance systems
were the only source of information to measure any direct
health impact.
The O104:H4 outbreak in 2011 originated in Northern
Germany and later affected 13 countries in Europe,
Canada and the United States of America. The outbreak
first developed unnoticed for around two weeks mainly
because of time lost in the information flow from local
to regional and national level in the decentralised epi-
demiological reporting system in Germany [43]. Upon
becoming aware of the outbreak, the German national
centre for disease control enhanced the frequency of
reporting from subnational to national level to daily
reporting and implemented a syndromic surveillance
system for bloody diarrhoea in emergency departments
[44]. We did not identify reports of syndromic surveil-
lance use in any of the other affected countries during
this public health emergency.
Timeliness of syndromic surveillance during three public
health emergencies
During the influenza pandemic, the syndromic surveil-
lance systems provided information on the onset or peak
of the pandemic on average half a week before traditional
Table 1 Key aspects of syndromic surveillance systems assessing the A/H1N1 pandemic in Europe*
Country System name/Short
description

















Individual Regional Local†, regional‡ R [21]
Belgium SIDARTHa Leuven Emergency
Department
Free-text Individual n.a. Local R [21]
SIDARTHa Belgium Ambulance service ICD-9 Individual National National R [21]
Belgian absenteeism
surveillance




National Regional, national P [22]
Denmark DMOS unscheduled general
practitioner influenza
surveillance
Primary care ILI checkbox in electronic
patient record
Close to national and
European






based on free-text, ICD-10









Free-text Close to CDC n.a. Local, regional P [26,27]








n.a. Local R [21,28]
Sweden GETWELL Web queries Free-text Individual, oriented at
European







Telephone helpline NHS Direct clinical
assessment system protocol










Absenteeism n.a., number of absent
students
n.a. (absenteeism due to
illness)
Local Local R [35]
UK retail sales surveillance Over-the-counter
sales
No information Individual n.a. Local, regional, national
(England)
R [36]
NHS 24 surveillance Scotland Telephone helpline Call protocol codes, free-text Individual National (Scotland) Local, regional,
national (Scotland)
P [37]
Europe Google Flu Trends
surveillance Europe
Web queries Free-text Individual n.a. National R [38]
*Europe = EU Member States, European Free Trade Zone countries, Acceding and Candidate countries.
†local = primary level of public health response in a country.














Table 2 Timeliness of syndromic surveillance systems assessing the A/H1N1 pandemic in Europe*
Country System name/Short
description
Data source Reference data source Timeliness [weeks] Reference
Aberration detection
algorithm signal






Austria SIDARTHa Tirol Emergency medical
dispatch centre
Sick leaves due to acute








+1.43 −1 −1 [21]
SIDARTHa Belgium Ambulance service Sentinel general
practitioners









Denmark DMOS unscheduled general
practitioner influenza
surveillance
Primary care Laboratory confirmations,
Sentinel general
practitioners
−1 (sentinel general practitioners)
0 (laboratory confirmation)
−1 [23]




+1.36 +1 +1 +1 [21]
























0 (sentinel general practitioners,
laboratory confirmations,
telephone helpline calls for
cold/flu‡) +1 (telephone
helpline calls for fever)‡
0 [35]
Europe Google Flu Trends
surveillance Europe
Web queries Sentinel general
practitioners
0 (7 countries) −2 [38]
- 1 (3 countries)
- 2 (1 country)
+1 (1 country)
−11 (1 country)§
Average all syndromic surveillance systems −0.56
*Europe = EU Member States, European Free Trade Zone countries, Acceding and Candidate countries.
†Timeliness values for this syndromic surveillance system were calculated as average for results from two waves during the 2009 pandemic.
‡This value was based on reference data that cannot be defined as traditional influenza surveillance source (= other syndromic surveillance source) and was excluded from further analysis.
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2 Y P [42]
*Europe = EU Member States, European Free Trade Zone countries, Acceding and Candidate countries.
†First report after first day of volcanic eruption.
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ness assessments did not take into account the common
reporting delay of traditional sentinel influenza surveil-
lance systems. They refer to an earlier detection of cases
analysing data sources in which (potential) influenza pa-
tients are registered earlier in the course of illness or treat-
ment, as compared to traditional data collected later in
the process by sentinel general practitioners or laborator-
ies. Additional time is gained because syndromic surveil-
lance information usually is available daily while sentinel
and laboratory information often is reported up to a week
after the case was registered [21,23,35]. Many syndromic
systems were already established and were ready to be
used when the pandemic occurred which saved time in
comparison to ad-hoc set up systems.
During the volcanic ash plume event, information was
made available to the English public one day after the first
day of eruption and two days afterwards in Scotland.
Information was updated in the following days and weeks
[42]. The first information from the systems in Austria,
Germany, and Spain was available to the public two weeks
after the first day of eruption and was updated again 10 days
later [41] (Table 1). There is no information on the timeli-
ness for the syndromic surveillance system in Sweden. As
there were no other health surveillance systems used during
the ash plume, there is no gold standard to compare the
timeliness of syndromic surveillance systems to.
During the O104:H4 outbreak, the syndromic surveil-
lance system was implemented on 27 May, 8 days after
Robert Koch-Institute was notified of a first cluster of
cases and 5 days after the EU and WHO were in-
formed. The system was terminated on 30 September
2011. Syndromic reporting was daily. The syndromicsurveillance system was set up ad-hoc, relied on manual
data collection and reporting (via fax or email) and was
voluntary. Thus, syndromic reporting varied in complete-
ness and continuity [43].
In synthesis, syndromic surveillance provided timely in-
formation during the three events supporting the IHR
(2005) requirement of immediate assessment and report-
ing. Also during other subnational and national emergen-
cies, syndromic surveillance provided timelier information,
as for example found in a review by Dailey et al. [45]. For
rare or non-communicable health threats such as the vol-
canic ash plume, there are often no established health sur-
veillance systems. As clinically specific systems cannot be
implemented for every conceivable health threat like the
volcanic ash plume, syndromic surveillance is often the
only source of timely information [46].
Added value of syndromic surveillance at the subnational
level during three public health emergencies
During the influenza pandemic, 13 out of 15 systems
provided syndromic information at the subnational level,
while nine systems and the European study provided
data at the national level (Table 1). Smith et al. [32],
Kavanagh et al. [37], and Todd et al. [36] highlighted the
use of local analyses for earlier identification of the onset
of the pandemic in certain regions compared to the na-
tional level analysis. Rosenkötter et al. compared among
others ambulance patient records at the local level in
one country with national level data in another and
found better validity for national level data [21]. The low
validity at the local level was explained by the difficulty
to differentiate signal from noise when very small case
numbers were analysed. The authors also compared
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level in two different countries and found that both pro-
vided syndromic data of sufficient validity and timeliness
compared to sentinel data in the regions. Case numbers
at these emergency departments were large enough for a
sound syndromic surveillance analysis. These examples
show that a valid application at the subnational level is
achievable if the analysed data source can potentially re-
flect a critical mass of cases.
During the volcanic ash plume event, information in
Sweden [29] and the United Kingdom (UK) was only pub-
lished for the national level, i.e., England and Scotland,
however, in Scotland also the subnational level was analysed
but no results were presented [42]. The systems in Austria,
Germany and Spain were providing information at the sub-
national level [41]. As during the influenza pandemic, the
systems in Austria and Germany were analysing low case
numbers which was affecting the validity of the results.
During the O104:H4 outbreak, 193 German emergency
departments participated in total, of which 28 were
located in the more effected areas. The subnational
syndromic data were aggregated to county level and
were assessed as suitable for the timely analysis of the
development of the outbreak [44].
In conclusion, syndromic surveillance can support pub-
lic health authorities at the subnational level to detect
events earlier or rapidly gain information about the health
impact of an event. Although many syndromic surveil-
lance systems are applied at the subnational level, the
added value compared to a national application is often
not analysed. The problem of distinguishing signals from
noise, especially of events with low case numbers, also be-
came apparent during other syndromic surveillance appli-
cations at subnational or national level [47,48].
All-hazard applicability of syndromic surveillance
The examples showed that syndromic surveillance was
used to assess the health impact of different (potential)
communicable and non-communicable PHEIC which is in
line with the all-hazard requirement of the IHR (2005).
Although these are only three examples, the flexibility of
syndromic surveillance to analyse different kinds of health
threats was shown during many subnational or national
level applications in Europe, such as mass-gatherings, e.g.,
the Olympic Games in the UK, environmental events, e.g.,
heat and cold waves or floods, and diverse communicable
disease outbreaks [13,20]. Also Paterson and colleagues
highlighted the “remarkable adaptability of syndromic sur-
veillance” in their recent review [15].
Comparability of syndromic surveillance output for
cross-border surveillance in Europe
We explore the European comparability of syndromic
surveillance systems, especially in terms of complianceto European case definitions used during the A/H1N1
influenza pandemic and the O104:H4 outbreak [6].
During the influenza pandemic, the 15 systems and the
European study analysed influenza-like illness (ILI) or re-
spiratory symptoms based on different case definitions
(Table 1). Some systems applied the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) definition for ILI [26,49] or
the European ILI definition established by ECDC [28]
which are based on symptoms. Others use aggregated
diagnostic information and not symptoms, self-defined
queries of standardised coding categories or free-text. Also
for syndromic surveillance systems based on the same
group of data sources, for instance emergency depart-
ments, the diagnostic coding systems differ. It might not
be achievable to use the European definition in a syn-
dromic surveillance system because the underlying source
does not provide all necessary information. For example,
the use of the European definition was attempted for the
syndromic surveillance system in Sweden but the analysed
data source of web queries did not provide all necessary
information [29]. For the system in Ireland, different defi-
nitions for free-text searches were compared, one being
based on the national definition, another one on the CDC
definition, but the best outcome for identifying influenza
cases was achieved using a definition which was tailored to
the available information in the data source [25]. Other
syndromic surveillance systems do not use a definition but
analyse the total volume which is reducing specificity, for
example systems using school absenteeism data [35,50,51].
These examples show that not one and the same case def-
inition can and should be applied when using syndromic
surveillance in order to achieve valid results. Although this
means that these case definitions are not comparable, most
systems analysed similar syndromes indicating ILI.
None of the examples provided evidence that syn-
dromic surveillance is capable of identifying an A/H1N1
case according to the full European clinical case defin-
ition. The syndromic surveillance systems could help
identify cases meeting a part of the clinical case defin-
ition, always depending on the information provided by
the analysed data source.
The EU did not provide any case definition during the
volcanic ash plume event. The cross-border comparabil-
ity of the definitions used by the different syndromic
surveillance systems is to be considered weak due to dif-
ferences in the analysed data sources as seen also during
the A/H1N1 pandemic.
During the O104:H4 outbreak, the syndromic surveil-
lance output could not meet the European clinical case
definition of Shiga Toxin-Producing Escherichia coli
(STEC)-associated Haemolytic Uremic Syndrome (HUS),
only for STEC/Verotoxin producing Escherichia coli re-
lated diarrhoea. Therefore, syndromic surveillance could
not contribute to clinical STEC-associated HUS case
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syndrome “bloody diarrhoea” can be considered high as it
is based on a relatively simply defined symptom which is
clearly distinguishable from other symptoms.
To conclude, syndromic surveillance can contribute to
identifying clinical cases according to the European case
definitions but it is unlikely that syndromic information
provides more detailed information to identify cases ac-
cording to full clinical case definitions as required by the
IHR (2005). Syndromic surveillance is rather suited to
augment existing surveillance systems in order to pro-
vide a timely indication of clinical cases to be verified by
traditional surveillance and assessment measures.
The low level of comparability of syndromic informa-
tion in Europe in terms of case definitions, data formats
and diagnostic coding does not speak for implementing
standardised syndromic surveillance systems at European
level or for aiming at a harmonisation of existing systems
in order to support cross-border surveillance. From a
pragmatic point of view one could argue that the systems
are analysing similarly defined syndromes, such as ILI, and
are in this way enabling cross-border surveillance. Also
the European influenza surveillance system is based on
different data sources and different case definitions of ILI
or acute respiratory illness [52-54].
Following this line of argument, the Triple S-AGE pro-
ject suggested three models of syndromic surveillance
harmonization in Europe: (A) a European syndromic sur-
veillance system model with standardised data sources
and case definitions as implemented for mortality moni-
toring in the European Mortality Monitoring system [55],
(B) a completely disharmonised European model as it is
existing at the moment for all morbidity syndromic sur-
veillance systems, and (C) an intermediate model with di-
verse data sources and case definitions but standardised
reporting at the European level [56]. Depending on the
characteristics of the syndrome/event and the opportunity
to generate comparable syndromes from the available
data, these models can exist in parallel. From a European
point of view, the goal might be to find the optimal com-
bination of these models with the largest possible har-
monisation to allow for cross-border comparison. In the
following section, we will look at the strengths and weak-
nesses of different implementation models of syndromic
surveillance at the subnational level in Europe (following
the Triple S-AGE models B and C).
Strengths and weaknesses of implementation models for
subnational syndromic surveillance in Europe
Current subnational syndromic surveillance implementation:
national vs. local model
The implementation of syndromic surveillance systems
for subnational surveillance in European countries cur-
rently follows either a national or a local model (Table 1).Syndromic surveillance systems following the national
model are hosted at the national level, collecting subna-
tional data, collating and analysing it at the national
level, and reporting surveillance results at the national
and subnational level. Examples for national syndromic
surveillance systems in Europe are especially found in
the UK [32,34,37,50,57] and France [58,59], which are
the longest established syndromic surveillance systems
in Europe. This might be explained by the fact that both
countries have centrally organised health systems [20].
Implementation of national systems is likely to be lim-
ited in federal countries with a long tradition of predom-
inantly decentralised health systems [10].
Syndromic surveillance systems following the local
model are hosted at the local level, collating and analys-
ing data covering a single jurisdiction and reporting sur-
veillance results for that jurisdiction only. Examples for
local syndromic surveillance systems are found in many
countries (Table 1), also in countries having national
syndromic surveillance systems, e.g., in Italy [26,60], and
the UK [35,61].
Table 4 compares the strengths and weaknesses of the
two models for some syndromic surveillance system
characteristics for which we could identify an impact by
the model of implementation. The characteristics are de-
fined following the framework for assessing syndromic
surveillance systems proposed by the CDC [62] and de-
tailed by the Triple S-AGE project [63].
National systems have the biggest advantage in simpli-
city and cost-effectiveness. To set up a syndromic sur-
veillance system at the national level without involving
too many stakeholders, based on national registries or a
national point of access to a network of data providers is
relatively easy. Examples for such systems are found in
Belgium [21], France [64] or the UK [36]. If data collec-
tion is organised regionally or different data collection
software is used as it is often the case for health care ser-
vices, access to data sources can be difficult, impeding
representativeness of the whole country and delaying
setup of a system, as reported for example for syndromic
surveillance systems in England [20].
Comparability of surveillance system results in na-
tional systems is high as data source, case definitions,
analysis methodology, and reporting are the same for
the whole country. The chance of detecting events cov-
ering multiple subnational jurisdictions is high in a na-
tional system and impossible in a local system. The
signal-to-noise problem of syndromic surveillance which
limits detection of events with small case numbers is the
same for both models.
A single national or local syndromic surveillance system
may be prone to become a “single point of failure” in times
of crises, because of a power failure, for example [7]. A
decentralised surveillance system can provide information
Table 4 Strengths and weaknesses of syndromic surveillance system implementation models in Europe*
Syndromic surveillance system characteristics National model† Local model‡ Integrated subnational model§
Simplicity and costs of setup ++ + –
Simplicity of access to subnational data sources – + +
Stability: Potential of single system failure in times of crisis – – ++
Acceptance and utilization of syndromic surveillance results at subnational level – ++ ++
Flexibility of adjustment to local events/priorities – ++ ++
Data protection problems – ++ ++
Data quality – ++ ++
Validity: Interpretation of signals including false alerts (signal-to-noise problem) – + +
Validity: Small-number problem in detecting local events – – –
Validity: Detection of events covering multiple local jurisdictions + – +
Representativeness of whole country + – ++
Comparability of surveillance results across multiple subnational jurisdictions ++ – +
Transferability between subnational jurisdictions + – +
Clinical resource and quality management in health care institutions – + +
Crisis preparedness of health care institutions – + +
*Europe = EU Member States, European Free Trade Zone countries, Acceding and Candidate countries.
†Data collation and analysis at national level, representing several subnational jurisdictions, top-down reporting to national, regional and local level.
‡Data collation and analysis at local level, representing a single subnational jurisdiction, local reporting to local level.
§Data collation and analysis at local level, analysis of aggregated data at regional or national level representing several subnational jurisdictions, standardised
bottom-up reporting to local, regional and national level.
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working.
The biggest advantage of the local syndromic surveil-
lance model is that it can be adjusted to the local cir-
cumstances of data availability and accessibility, data
collection procedures, treatment seeking behaviour of
the population and priorities for targeted health threats.
Syndromic surveillance performs best if fine-tuned to
the characteristics of the analysed data source as shown
for the influenza syndromic surveillance system in Spain,
for example [28].
A local system which is operated by the professionals
responsible for local surveillance is more easily “owned”
by these professionals and will foster motivation and
quality of work, compared to a system which is imposed
by the national level [20,65].
A close collaboration between local public health au-
thorities and local health care institutions which often
function as data providers can simplify the setup and
maintenance of syndromic surveillance systems. Data
providers know their data and the context of data collec-
tion best. They can identify the most suitable data fields
for analysis which improves data quality, and they can
support interpretation of syndromic surveillance results
by giving explanations for signals. Collaboration between
health care institutions and public health authorities for
a syndromic surveillance system can enhance collabor-
ation of these two often divided parts of the health sys-
tem for crisis preparedness [10]. Finally, syndromic
surveillance output based on health care data can alsobe useful to support clinical resource management in
health care institutions during times of crisis [8].
Another advantage of local systems is that raw data
are analysed in the same local jurisdiction compared to a
national system where data are leaving the jurisdiction
to be analysed at the national level. This can reduce
problems of data privacy that are arising from analysing
patient information [66].
In summary, there are distinct advantages and disad-
vantages of the national and the local syndromic surveil-
lance system models which are hampering to make the
best use of syndromic surveillance. Systems should at
best be set up locally adjusted but also covering a large
part of the population. In the following we propose a
system model that combines these advantages of the na-
tional and local system model.
A new model: Subnational syndromic surveillance
implementation
We suggest a new implementation model in which syn-
dromic surveillance is integrated in existing surveillance
structures at the subnational level. Data collation and
analysis are done at the local level, while higher levels
can analyse aggregated syndromic data or only receive
reports. This is to be decided in each country and will
depend on the organisation of the public health and sur-
veillance system. Transferring aggregated instead of raw
data or reports to higher levels has the advantage that
data privacy rules are respected. Reporting of surveil-
lance results for the local, regional and national level is
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live up to its potential by covering a large part of the
population and several jurisdictions.
In the EU project “European Emergency Data Based
System for Information on, Detection and Analysis of
Risks and Threats to Health” (SIDARTHa), we developed
a subnational syndromic surveillance implementation mo-
del based on three different emergency care data sources
[67]. Figure 1 depicts the setup, data flow and reporting
directions in a SIDARTHa syndromic surveillance system.
A decision tree was developed for the SIDARTHa ap-
proach for validation of signals so that not every syn-
dromic signal results in a public health response [68].
Currently, the SIDARTHa system is implemented in one
region in the countries of Austria (active), Belgium (pilot),
Germany (pilot) and Spain (active) [21,68].
Table 4 compares the strengths and weaknesses of the
subnational model compared to the local and national
model. The model combines the advantages of the local
and the national model for most characteristics. An add-
itional improvement of this model is the stability in
times of crisis by the decentralised setup of systems.Figure 1 The SIDARTHa model for integrated syndromic surveillance
are implemented at subnational level and can be based on one or differen
chosen and adjusted according to the immediate context. The syndromic
system of the responsible subnational health authority augmenting existing
only be reported to higher levels in aggregated form limiting problems ari
level but could also be done at national levels to allow for detection of eve
should also receive access to syndromic surveillance results for their institu
planning purposes.Further, representativeness is anticipated to be increased
through easier access to subnational data sources by
subnational surveillance system operators. However,
comparability of surveillance results in terms of case def-
initions, data formats and diagnostic coding systems can
be anticipated lower as in a national system setup.
Systems following the subnational model are likely to
differ in their setup because they are adjusted to the
local accessibility and characteristics of data sources in
each region. The comparability can be increased if a
common framework is used for setting up a system, as
for example developed by the European projects
SIDARTHa and Triple S-AGE.
The major disadvantage in comparison to the local
and national model is the higher effort and complexity
in the setup of a decentralised and locally adjusted
system. Because of the high effort, the two active
SIDARTHa systems in Austria and Spain could only be
implemented as local systems providing information for
one region in the respective country. For a roll-out to
other regions we consider political endorsement and
support from higher levels as vital.at the subnational level. SIDARTHa syndromic surveillance systems
t kinds of data sources. In this way, the data analysis algorithms can be
surveillance results feed into the established surveillance and reporting
(traditional) surveillance information. Syndromic information would
sing from data privacy. Investigation of signals is done at subnational
nts covering several jurisdictions. The data providing institutions
tion and/or jurisdiction which could be used by them for resource
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We conclude that syndromic surveillance can support
countries to detect and assess the public health impact of
different types of PHEIC at the subnational level as stipu-
lated in the IHR (2005) core surveillance capacity require-
ments. The approach provided timely information during
three different public health emergencies in Europe. For
some events syndromic surveillance systems were the only
available source of near real-time information. Many syn-
dromic surveillance systems are applied at the subnational
level, which in some cases proved to be of advantage for
detecting an event earlier compared to the national level.
Syndromic surveillance is not suited to detect local events
consisting of small case numbers.
In terms of case definitions, data formats or diagnostic
coding systems, syndromic surveillance systems are not
identical across Europe because of the diversity of the
analysed data sources. Nevertheless, we consider com-
parable cross-border surveillance possible based on simi-
larly defined syndromes.
Implementation of syndromic surveillance in Europe
currently follows either a local or national model. In
order to gain the most of syndromic surveillance we sug-
gest a new subnational approach of implementing syn-
dromic surveillance. The model foresees locally adjusted
data collation and analysis at the subnational level, and
integrated and standardised reporting to higher levels.
By covering a large part of the population, events cover-
ing several jurisdictions can be identified at higher levels.
However, the setup of decentralised and locally adjusted
systems is more complex compared to setup of one na-
tional or local system.
Using guidelines and tools produced by European
syndromic surveillance projects and with national or
European policy support, a wider roll-out of syndromic
surveillance across Europe can be achieved. Only by
expanding the application of syndromic surveillance,
European countries will be positioned to timely assess
the public health impact of potential PHEIC, especially
rare and non-communicable events.
Endnotes
aThe literature search was accomplished in June 2013
and updated in July 2014. The search string for PubMed
was: (H1N1[Title/Abstract] OR pandemic[Title/Abstract])
AND “syndromic surveillance”[Title/Abstract]. The search
string for Google Scholar was: H1N1 OR pandemic AND
“syndromic surveillance”. The review of Google Scholar
hits stopped after 10 pages of hits which did not provide
any new relevant content. We checked references of se-
lected full-text articles for further relevant publications.
bThe additional identified systems were the SurSauUD
emergency department and general practitioner house calls
surveillance systems in France, the national emergencydepartment surveillance system and the Lazio emergency
department surveillance system in Italy, the South Holland
South general practitioner pandemic surveillance system in
the Netherlands, the PIPeR general practitioner pandemic
surveillance system in Scotland, the general practitioner
out-of-hours surveillance system in Ireland, and the general
practitioner surveillance system in Wales.
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